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0 - Abstract 
 
Several modern and post-modern philosophical efforts directed towards understanding human 
ontologies recognize the limit of their inquiry in the ‗human scale‘. In other words, philosophers 
concerned with ontological interrogatives often consider their questions to be inescapably 
determined by our possibilities to perceive and classify our environment as human beings. Maurizio 
Ferraris, for example, deemed ontology to be primarily concerned with the perceptibility and 
invariance of common things that human beings can encounter, interact with, and understand via 
their proximal experience of the world. More specifically, Ferraris identified in mesoscopy (the 
middle scale, the spatio-temporal scale of phenomena that human beings can natively perceive and 
understand) the fundamental context of any human ontologies. 
 
The concept of mesoscopy that was just outlined relies on an essentialist understanding of the 
human being, a perspective that Ferraris shares, at different levels and among others, with Martin 
Heidegger. From their perspective, our possibilities to perceive the world, manipulate it, and think 
about it (our ‗scale‘) depends on characteristics of the human being that are, in essence, universal. 
In line with this belief, philosophers embracing an essentialist perspective would claim that the 
technologies that are constitutive to human existence (in everyday life as well as in scientific 
research or space exploration) do not effectively broaden the reach of human ontologies, but rather 
distance mankind from their native and genuine relationship with reality. 
 
In this essay, I argue that ontologies that do not accompany mankind and its socio-cultural practices 
in its historical process of change and self-discovery cannot be expected to provide reliable 
foundations for our progressively more technically-mediated social practices. Consequently, the 
discipline of ontology can only be expected to be relevant and useful in our progressively more 
technologically-involved society if reframed in ways that can accompany socio-cultural practices in 
their historical process of change, and that can assist mankind in its projectual pursuit for meaning, 
balance, and self-discovery. In the attempt to overcome an essentialist understanding of ontology, 
and supported by insights coming from the philosophy of technology, this essay proposes to 
reframe the discipline of ontology as an historical and projectual branch of philosophy. 
 
 
1 – Introduction 
 
In the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, the term ‗world‘ generally indicates a set 
composed of beings that are understood together with all their (detectable) properties and mutual 
relationships. More specifically, a world describes that set as experienced by one of the beings 
involved in it. To be identified as a world, that experience needs to be persistently perceivable and 
behaviourally consistent, as those qualities are necessary to make it emerge as an intelligible world 
for a being within a certain spatial-temporal context. To put it simply, a world indicates a way in 
which reality is disclosed to a being (Verbeek, 2005, 108). 
 
On the basis of this definition of what a world is, when talking about ‗an ontology‘ I am referring to 
it as a way to structure the knowledge that emerges from specific perceptual, cognitive, and 
operational relationships with a world. Elaborating on this basic definition, philosophers 
customarily identify with ‗ontology‘ a discipline (or set of disciplines) concerned with the 
fundamental study of the things that can be said to exist in a world, their qualities, and 
interrelationships.  
 
Several ontological approaches and perspectives concerning the nature of being, of becoming, of 
experience, and of reality punctuated the history and the development of the Western tradition of 
thought. Since their dawning in ancient Greece, ontological approaches to knowledge have been 
more or less explicitly confined, in their experiential horizon, to the human scale; that is to say, 
confined to perceiving and understanding qualities and phenomena that are natively possible to be 
encountered and interacted with by human beings. Traditional human ontologies consequently 
focused on understanding things and groups of things that were neither too big nor too small, and 
phenomena that were neither too fast nor too slow. In other words, traditional human ontologies 
implicitly adopted the mesoscale as their field of philosophical inquiry. In that respect, it is not a 
coincidence that our original measuring units – i.e. feet, palms, and arms – originally derived from 
our human bodies and were used as tools to frame our experience of the world. A heritage of that 
mesoscopic origin is still evident in the comfortably human scale of our current measurement units: 
the meter, the litre, the yard, the kilogram, the pound, et cetera. 
 
Starting from the early Modern period, the successful practical applications of the empirical 
sciences together with the wide-ranging advancements that they fostered (for example in the fields 
of industrial production, medicine, et cetera) contributed to the branding of ontology as an exoteric, 
speculative discipline, relegating it to a secondary cultural role
1
 (Gualeni, 2015, 26). To paraphrase 
American scholar Catherine Wilson, it was as if the natural sciences had taken control of what had 
been mutual territory for investigation, leaving only subjective experience to philosophy (Wilson, 
2000, 67).  
 
On the background of the secondary cultural role that is currently attributed to ontological inquiry, 
this paper argues for new ways to look at the discipline of ontology with the objective of 
rediscovering its insights and methods in ways that can be relevant and useful in our technological 
lifeworld. What I am advocating for here is not a revival of a dead discipline, but rather a 
repurposing of the philosophical questions and methods of ontology as fruitful tools to understand 
our progressively more technically-involved worlds and socio-cultural practices. In the pursuit of 
such objective, this essay will start by criticizing a traditional, and traditionally essentialist 
understanding of the discipline of ontology. When discussing ‗essentialism‘ in philosophy, the term 
commonly refers to the belief that certain qualities of human beings and certain ways of 
experiencing the world as human beings are shared by all mankind. Such traits are recognized by 
philosophers holding an essentialist perspective to be unchanging and independent of socio-cultural 
context. In their necessity and universality, those essential traits of humanity allegedly constitute the 
basis for the definition of what ‗a human being‘ is. Using Martin Heidegger‘s and Maurizio 
Ferraris‘s early works as examples, I will specifically focus my criticism on two aspects of an 
essentialist understanding of human beings and human ontologies. In particular, I am referring here 
to: 
 
1. the belief that technological artefacts do not participate in the structuring of genuine human 
ontologies (mostly discussed in the second section of this paper), and 
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 German philosopher Helmuth Plessner noted that, after Descartes, theoretical knowledge forced mesoscopic ontology 
(―natural philosophy‖) out of its original shape into a system of techniques, empirical activities, and principles of 
reasoning known as ―the scientific method.‖ (Plessner, 2006) 
2. the understanding of mesoscopy as the exclusive and epistemologically impermeable domain 
for the development of human ontologies (this aspect will be chiefly criticized in the third 
section). 
 
In the fourth section and fifth sections of this essay, insights and perspectives coming from the 
field of the philosophy of technology will contribute to the recognition of some historical (that is, 
non-essentialist) aspects that characterize human ontologies. In particular, the fifth section will 
identify three additional ways to ontologise that are either facilitated by technologies or can only 
ensue from our relations with certain technologies
2
. 
 
In the sixth and conclusive section, this essay will present a reflection on the cultural role of 
ontology and argue a case for a reframing it as a projectual (and, as such, inevitably self-reflexive) 
discipline. Two additional philosophical corollaries to a non-essentialist reframing of ontology will 
be also offered in this last section, namely the worth of an archaeological approach to ontology as a 
new philosophical branch, and the reformulation of mesoscopy as an historical concept. 
 
 
 
2 – A reflection on Heidegger’s ontological essentialism 
 
In his existential analysis of the experience of being that is specific to the human being (experience 
which he calls Dasein, often translated in English as ‗human existence‘), German philosopher 
Martin Heidegger identified three constitutive dimensions that characterize our being-in-the-world. 
Focusing on the temporal character of human existence, Heidegger proposes to analyse the way in 
which human beings are in the world in terms of their: 
 
 Thrownness (Geworfenheit): Dasein is always ‗thrown‘ into existence, and characterized by 
qualities and conditions that it has no control over. This is what Heidegger calls ‗facticity‘. 
In other words, Dasein is inescapably ‗thrown in the world‘ in a certain way that provides 
the inescapable basis for its existence. From the perspective of its temporality, we can say 
that Dasein is always ‗thrown out‘ of a certain past that determines its present and future 
trajectories.  
 
 Everydayness (Verfallenheit): Literally ‗fallenness‘, everydayness is the way in which 
Dasein is commonly absorbed in its quotidian affairs. In its everydayness, human beings run 
the risk of busying themselves in trivialities and forgetting the crucial questions of their 
existence. In this ‗fallen‘ way of being in the present, Dasein tends to mindlessly align with 
what is socially expected of it, while detaching from what Heidegger identifies as its 
‗authenticity‘ (Eigentlichkeit). 
 
 Projectuality (Entworfenheit): In its projectual (or projective) dimensions, Dasein‘s 
existence has the character of openness towards its future potentiality for being. As human 
beings, according to Heidegger, we are always directed towards a future in which we can 
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 The understanding of the term ‗technology‘ utilized in this paper draws on Dutch philosopher Jos De Mul‘s work in 
philosophy of technology. In his book Filosofie in Cyberspace: Reflectie op de informatie- en communicatietechnologie 
(Philosophy in Cyberspace: A reflection on information and communication technologies), technology is broadly 
defined as ―a conglomerate of […] artefacts, specific forms of knowledge and capabilities […] (embraced in their 
necessary relation with the relative) geographical and social infrastructure, economic interests and societal norms and 
values.‖ (De Mul, 2010, 30) 
 
realize our possibilities, construct our existence, and concern ourselves with the inevitability 
of our death. 
 
Heidegger‘s analysis also relied, in the early phases of his thinking, on what can be understood as a 
largely essentialist understanding of mankind. As a case in point, both Heidegger‘s 1927 book 
Being and Time understands human existence in an ahistorical light. In that light, human existence 
is crucially defined by those unchanging traits that all human beings allegedly share regardless of 
culture of provenance, historical period, stage of technological development, formal education, et 
cetera. 
 
Technological development, in particular, was a central issue of concern for Heidegger. As a 
reaction to the growing mechanization of the world that he witnessed at the beginning of last 
century, Heidegger understood the technological mindset as the most extreme form of 
objectification of human values and human beings alike. Rather than embracing technologies as 
additional ways for engaging with reality, the early phases of Heidegger‘s thought regarded all 
forms of mechanized optimization and automation as forms of ‗severance‘ from the world. An 
analogous approach to technology can be recognized in the work of Jacques Ellul and Herbert 
Marcuse among others, and a similar techno-pessimistic perspective guided the work of social 
theorists of the same period, including, notably, Arnold Toynbee. 
 
Technical and biological development as well as political and socio-cultural transformations are 
thus embraced by the early Heidegger as the products of an epochal change in the ways humans 
relate to the world, and not as contributing to those transformations (as either causes or 
concomitant factors). To rephrase this concept in simpler terms, and to bring the discussion back to 
Heidegger‘s analysis of Dasein, Heidegger understood the technological mindset as a deficient 
mode of being: as a way to be-in-the-world that adds to the inauthenticity of our ‗everydayness‘. In 
this sense, Heidegger believed that no forms of technological extension can be recognized as 
capable of assisting us in our ‗projectual‘ realization as authentic human beings. Relying on an 
essentialist understanding of the human experience of being and on gloomy predictions of techno-
cultural disaster, his early thought presents a monolithic, ahistorical understanding of what human 
ontologies are. 
 
It is not uncommon to identify essentialist traits in several modern and post-modern approaches to 
humanism and the social sciences. Philosophers and scholars adopting similar stances customarily 
appoint a universal and ahistorical understanding of the ‗human scale‘ as the limit of their inquiry. 
These constraints are typically set in the attempt to both distance their scholarly efforts from those 
of other gnoseological disciplines (such as epistemology or the natural sciences), and with the 
objective of substantiating the existence of their ‗knowledge domain‘3.  
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 I find the distinction between ontology and the natural sciences (chemistry, physics, astronomy, et cetera) posed by 
the essentialists to be particularly revelatory in terms of their stance towards technology and technological development: 
while the alleged ‗authentic human kinds of ontologies‘ are presented as non-evolutionary and impermeable to 
technological development (if not entirely at odds with it), the natural sciences are characterized by their constant 
struggle to refine and expand their bodies of knowledge. In the context of the dichotomy discussed above, I believe it is 
particularly interesting to note that developments in the natural sciences occur through shifts and revolutions in 
epistemological paradigms that are always concomitant with, and often directly triggered by, technological 
advancements. 
 
3 – Ontology as a mesoscopic, descriptive discipline in Ferraris’s early work 
 
An example of the just outlined essentialist approach can be identified in the early scholarly work of 
contemporary Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris. In his 2002 essay ‗Inemendabilita‘, Ontologia, 
Realtà Sociale‘, Ferraris deemed ontology to be concerned with the perceptibility and the invariance 
of common things that human beings can encounter, interact with, and understand in their native 
and proximal experience of the world (Ferraris, 2002, 7 – 12). Consequently, he identified in the 
mesoscopy (the middle scale, the spatio-temporal scale of phenomena that human beings can 
natively relate to) the fundamental context of any human ontologies. 
 
Further explaining his position on the inevitable mesoscopy of human ontologies, Ferraris clarified 
that he considered it absurd to affirm that things that have too big a scale or too small a scale can 
never become part of ontologies. Since the dawning of optics, for example, a multitude of non-
mesoscopic entities became part of human ontologies by means of technical mediation: it is only 
through the intercession of instruments such as the microscope or the telescope that we could start 
to classify microorganisms and to observe distant galaxies. Strictly speaking, however, at that point 
we are no longer discussing human ontologies as, according to Ferraris, human ontologies are solely 
concerned with the things, properties, beliefs, and sensations that pertain to the unabridged 
experience of our mesoscopic, everyday engagement with the world (Ferraris, 2002, 10 – 12). As 
such, for the Italian philosopher, human ontologies can be said to have undergone little-to-no 
historical evolution since we started to philosophize about them
4
 (Ferraris, 2002, 16).  
 
Ferraris‘s position thus deliberately ignores the socio-cultural determination of the 
phenomenological sphere on which, by definition, human beings structure their kinds of ontologies.  
On this basis, I believe it is evident that no linguistic conventions, no ideological beliefs, and no 
ontological structures can ever aspire to have ubiquitous or ahistorical truth values, as they are 
themselves artifacts established in specific cultures to permit and facilitate communication and 
allow for the development of ideas as well as plans of action. Ontologies, ideas, and habits can give 
the impression of stability and absoluteness only when they are firmly established in a certain socio-
cultural (context. They are, to borrow the words of Friedrich Nietzsche in his unpublished 1873 
essay ‗On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense‘,   
 
―[a] mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations which have 
been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and 
rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and 
obligatory to a people […]‖ 
 
With the objective of arguing for a historical understanding of both the human being and its 
mesoscale as the conditions for a fruitful use of an ontological approach to our progressively more 
technologically-involved culture, I believe it is desirable to problematize, first and foremost, 
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 In the fourth chapter of The Robot in the Garden (Wilson in Goldberg, 2000), the already mentioned Catherine Wilson 
argued that 18th-century philosophers developed theories of landscape as a reaction to the appearance of the 
locomotive, and that – similarly - 20th-century phenomenologists developed theories about the immediacy of 
experience in response to the emergence of the automobile, the radio, and electrical appliances (Wilson in Goldberg, 
2000, 66). Both groups of theories privileged, according to Wilson, everyday objects and familiar relationships over the 
distant and inscrutable workings of machine technology. In analogy with Wilson‘s approach, one could suggest the 
existence of a relationship between essentialistic ways to understand human ontologies and the diffusion of tele- and 
virtual technologies. What those technologies offer can, in fact, be understood as ways to augment and externalize the 
human possibilities for perceiving and operating in the world. Consequently, virtual technologies and tele-technologies 
could be interpreted as threatening the primacy and originality of human experience (cfr. Section 5 of this essay). 
Ferraris‘s establishment of an essentialist understanding of the mesoscale as the exclusive context 
of the discipline of ontology.  
 
My objection to Ferraris‘s stance has to do with the ways in which insights deriving from the 
natural sciences and from other forms of philosophical inquiry (for example ethics or epistemology) 
contribute to the ways in which we interpret our experience of mesoscopic phenomena and how we 
behave in relation to them. A practical example will hopefully be helpful to both clarify my 
resistance to Ferraris‘s perspectives and to make the ontological relevance of technology more 
evident. The case I will briefly discuss here, and that is often mentioned by Dutch philosopher 
Peter-Paul Verbeek, is that of technically-assisted diagnostics. The diagnosis for diabetes requires, 
for instance, that a blood sample is taken from a subject and analysed in a medical lab to be tested 
and analysed spectrophotometrically. I believe it is intuitively clear how being tested positively for 
diabetes (together with having received medical information about that metabolic disease) is likely 
to have direct re-ontologizing effects on human beings with regard to their attitudes and their 
conduct towards sugary foods and their consumption. The implication here is that a 
spectrophotometer has a direct influence in the ways we understand our metabolism and our 
mortality. Similarly, Verbeek pointed out that ultrasound, when used for pre-natal screening, 
―radically changes the experience of being pregnant and the interpretations of unborn life.‖ 
(Verbeek, 2011, 27) In summary, through the mediation of technology (microscopes, telescopes, 
spectrophotometers, ultrasound machines, et cetera) human kinds of ontologies are restructured and 
enriched in specific ways that transcend the native effectors and the ‗middle scale‘ of human beings. 
 
In order to avoid similar, and similarly obvious, observations from pinning down ontology as a 
subset of epistemology, Ferraris added an extra restriction to what he labels ‗ontology‘ (2002, 9), 
posing a further distinction between  
 
 disciplines that focus on the perceptions of our mesoscopic world (a field of inquiry that is, 
according to Ferraris, the exclusive context of ontology), and 
 
 disciplines that provide explanations of our mesoscopic world (among which, for example, 
epistemology, epidemiology, marine biology, ballistics, optometry, medical diagnostics, et 
cetera).  
 
This extra definitory restriction in Ferraris‘s early work does not, however, provide additional 
conceptual tools that can help us answer the question of what relevance and what roles the study of 
ontologies can have in our technological age. Rather, it defers the problem of a critical and 
contextual definition of ‗human ontologies‘ to the problem of neatly separating the perceptions of 
phenomena from their explanations. In articulating a philosophical reflection on ontology in relation 
to the human scale, I find Ferraris‘s perspective to be unsatisfactory for two main reasons: 
 
1) because the very possibility of a separation between perception and explanation is never 
explicitly articulated or problematized in his work, remaining a definitory ‗rug‘ under which 
to sweep the problem of the relevance of an essentialist ontology as a foundation for the 21
st
 
century social sciences, and 
 
2) because confining the domain of ontology solely within the limits of human perception is 
methodologically incompatible with the definition of ‗ontology‘ provided at the beginning 
of this text. My initial definition of ontology embraced, in fact, not only the perceptions of 
the things and properties that are in a world, but also all the detectable relationships among 
those things and properties. Proceeding from that definition, all the knowledge that can be 
accumulated about a world does effectively contribute to the structuring of our ontological 
understanding of it. I do not see any reasons, apart from the already mentioned desire to 
protect one‘s ‗knowledge domain‘, why in the structuring of mesoscopic ontologies we 
should exclude technological mediation or dismiss insights offered by explanatory 
disciplines. 
 
Ferraris‘s position becomes even more problematic to accept when we do not solely focus our 
attention on the ontological effects of technologies that are specifically capable of revealing new 
interpretations and new dimensions of our world. In fact, the question of the roles of technological 
mediation in the structuring of human ontologies (as well as the possibility for neatly and 
meaningfully separating the domains of ontology and technology) further complicates when we 
analyse other kinds of ways in which technologies contribute to our lifeworld. This is the case, for 
example, of technological systems that work without the need of our awareness of them or of our 
active, intentional use. To resort to American philosopher Don Ihde‘s phrasing, those technologies 
function as barely detectable background presences, and include semiautomatic technologies such 
as the fridge or the thermostat. Those ‗background‘ technologies are not providing any 
‗explanations‘ of the world, and yet they are by definition integrated and constitutive elements of 
our mesoscopic experience of the world. 
 
As already hinted in the previous paragraph, the following sections of this paper will shift their 
focus from the general socio-cultural determination of human phenomenologies and human 
ontologies (which was the foundation for my critical perspectives towards essentialistic positions) 
to the ways in which our technologies contribute in making our relationships with the world 
malleable and unstable. With this objective in mind, perspectives and insights coming from the 
philosophy of technology and philosophical anthropology will be structural to my argument for the 
rejection of an essentialist and purely descriptive understanding of the discipline of ontology. 
 
 
 
4 – “The apostate of nature” 
 
Differently from the pessimistic perspectives outlined in the previous section that understood 
technologies as inauthentic and privative dimensions of human existence, the work of German 
philosopher Helmuth Plessner presents the artificial world of culture (which also includes art, 
religion, and technological development) as a second nature for mankind. Culture is understood by 
Plessner as the general context where human beings can ―make something of themselves‖ and 
pursue the state of balance and completeness that they characteristically lack and inherently aspire 
to achieve (Gualeni, 2015, 113-114). 
 
On these premises, Plessner elaborated his understanding of the human being as the ―apostate of 
nature‖ or, as explained in his first ‗anthropological law‘, a creature that is ―artificial by nature.‖ 
What Plessner upheld in his philosophical anthropology is simply that the need for supplementation 
of an unnatural kind is structural to who we are as a species (Plessner, 1980–1984, IV, 382–385). 
He believed that mankind inherently aspires to the transcendence of its original (natural) condition 
through the establishment of new, artificial worlds (Plessner, 1980–1984, IV, 385). Put somewhat 
more simply, Plessner understood any forms of cultural and technological efforts as artificial ways 
to try to supplement – or more generally to come to terms with – the finitude and incompleteness 
that define human existence. 
 
The understanding of technology and the social roles of technology outlined in the previous 
paragraphs were articulated by Plessner from a specific perspective (that of philosophical 
anthropology) which developed at the beginning of the twentieth century and attempted to make 
sense of the human condition by combining perspectives from biology and philosophy (De Mul, 
2015, 458, 459). The general conception of technology as the context where human beings can 
biologically transcend their native, lacking condition is not exclusive to Plessner. Philosophical 
fields such as media philosophy and the philosophy of technology specifically focus on the 
possibility of technological mediation for overcoming the difficulties and the disturbances arising 
from the human beings‘ disconnection from one another, and their limited extension in time and 
space (Gualeni, 2015, 153).  
 
Modern philosophy of technology was inaugurated by the German Philosopher Ernst Kapp at the 
end of the 19
th
 century. Kapp was the first scholar to explicitly frame the idea that technical 
artefacts are extensions (or rather ―projections‖) of functions that were originally carried out by 
human organs. More recently, and as already mentioned in the previous section of this essay, Don 
Ihde understood technology as having an implicit influence on the ways in which we experience our 
world(s) and structure our relationships with it(them). His work will be discussed in finer detail in 
the fifth section of this essay, where the focus will specifically be on the effects of our technological 
lifeworld on our ontologies and mesoscopy.  
 
When discussing the perceptual and hermeneutic implications of our technologies, I believe it is 
crucial to clarify that I do not simply refer to their affording new possibilities to perceive, 
understand, and manipulate things (for example through technologies such as the microscope, the 
telescope, or the microtome), but I am also concerned with their more implicit influences as 
heuristic devices
5
. The invention of the mechanical clockwork is often used to illustrate the notion 
outlined above, that is to say that our technological environments shape our ways of thinking in 
ways that are subtler and more pervasive than the actual functions offered by technologies or 
technological systems. In the early modern period the precise, ingenious mechanism of clocks such 
as that of the Minster in Strasbourg persuaded the classical physicists that nature worked like 
clockwork (Dijksterhuis, 1986, 442f). American media theorist Neil Postman noted that, similarly 
to metaphors, our technologies ―classify the world for us, sequence it, frame it, enlarge it, reduce it, 
colour it, argue a case for what the world is like.‖ 6 (Postman, 2005, 10) 
 
In line with what was observed in the last few paragraphs, this essay supports the idea that the 
various ways in which we can perceive worlds, understand them, engage in worldly practices, and 
reflect on ourselves cannot suitably be understood apart from the technologies and technological 
systems that contribute and disclose those worlds for us. If we are willing to accept that technology 
plays a constitutive role in our lifeworld, and notwithstanding of the illustrious philosophical 
tradition concerned with a strictly mesoscopic pursuit of ontological knowledge, I believe it is 
cogent to question the relevance and the value of programmatically constraining the study of 
ontology to the mesoscale. To formulate these interrogatives more explicitly: can the development 
and the study of ontologies provide a plausible and reliable foundation for our (progressively more 
technically-mediated) culture and social practices, when such ontological activities are pursued on 
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 In philosophy, a ‗heuristic device‘ indicates a conceptual tool that enables a certain understanding of something, or to 
develop a specific kind of knowledge concerning something. A functional model of a certain thing is a good example of 
a heuristic device: it discloses and frames certain functional aspects or dimensions of what it models, and yet it is never 
identical with what it models. In this sense, and as contextualized in the rest of the paragraph, metaphors, analogies, 
parables, et cetera can also function as heuristic devices.   
 
6
 In the age of digital media, as a recent example of the apparently inevitable tendency of philosophy to think through 
technological metaphors, Italian philosopher Luciano Floridi claimed that – at a certain level of abstraction – everything 
that exists can be understood as a ―data structure‖, as an ―informational object‖. Understanding human beings as data 
structures, continued Floridi, entails accepting the idea that, as informational agents, we might not be very different 
from the artificial and intelligent agents with whom we share a global environment (a global environment that is also, 
ultimately, comprised of information) (Floridi, 2009, 16). 
the premises of an unchanging human nature? Should not the discipline of ontology strive, instead, 
to accompany mankind and its socio-cultural practices in its historical process of change and self-
discovery? And what would a reframing of ontology entail in terms of our understanding of the 
‗middle scale‘? 
 
In the next section of this essay, inspired and guided by Don Ihde‘s postphenomenological approach 
to the philosophy of technology, I will try to answer these question, starting with delineating an 
outline of the ways in which technologies influence and extend what we understand as the ‗human 
scale‘ as well as the horizons of human ontologies. By identifying and categorizing the effects of 
our technology on the ways in which we perceive, understand, and operate in worlds, this essay will 
put into question the idea of ‗genuineness‘ in relation to human existence and human kinds of 
ontologies. It will, moreover, problematize the essentialist understanding of the human scale. 
 
 
 
5 – The effects of technologies on our ontologies and our understanding of the human scale 
 
As already hinted in several occasions along the development of my argument, I consider the work 
of Don Ihde to be particularly useful in trying to reframe ontology as a projectual discipline in our 
progressively more technically-involved worlds and socio-cultural practices. Ihde‘s 
postphenomenological perspective focuses on the ways in which technological artifacts (as well as 
the ways they are appropriated in social practices) influence our lifeworld as human beings. More 
specifically, in his 1990 book Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth, Ihde presented 
his understanding of the perceptual and hermeneutic implications of technologies by analyzing the 
specific ways in which certain technologies contribute to how reality can be experienced and 
interpreted by human beings. In particular, Ihde outlined four different types of possible 
relationships between humans and worlds that emerge from technological mediation: 
 
1. EMBODIED RELATIONS: in embodied relations, technologies form a unicum with the 
human beings involved in their uses. When engaging the world through embodied 
technologies, some of the limitations inherent in being humans are overcome by means of 
their technological supplementation. Talking to another person through the phone allows us 
to extend our possibilities to communicate beyond our native spatial scale; when in an 
embodied relationship with a microscope, our possibilities for perceiving the world extends 
to the scale of the individual cell. Ihde schematized the embodied relations that we can 
establish with specific technologies as follows:  
 
 
 
In this synthetic diagram above, the parentheses bracket human and technology as a single 
system (a cyborg); the arrow symbolizes an intentional stance towards something. In simpler 
words, in embodied relations with technologies, a new being emerges and deliberately 
addresses a world in ways that can be (non-exclusively) perceptual, cognitive, and 
operational. 
 
 
 
2. HERMENEUTIC RELATIONS: This second group of technologies does not allow us to 
use our native senses in an extended or delocalized fashion, as was the case for the 
embodied relationships, but rather provides us with an intelligible representation (or 
interpretation) of some aspects of reality that our native senses cannot perceive. Commonly 
cited examples of these kinds of relationships are the MRI scan (capable of revealing the 
electrical activity of the brain) and the metal detector. Ihde understood technologies that 
establish such an interpretative, hermeneutic relationship with human beings to be part of 
the world, rather than merged with the human beings engaging with them. He schematized 
the hermeneutic relation that we can establish with specific technologies as follows: 
 
 
 
 
3. ALTERITY RELATIONS: Technologies establishing alterity relations with us do not 
filter or enhance our capabilities for interaction and perception, but are rather the terminus 
of our experience. As such, they often disclose new worlds for their users, artificial worlds 
whose experience temporarily set aside the experience and the interaction with the actual 
world. As Ihde explained, the world that we share as biological creatures does not have an 
active role as far as the interaction is concerned, but remains in the background of the 
experience. Commonly used examples to encapsulate alterity relations are getting money 
from an ATM machine or playing a videogame. Ihde schematized the alterity relations that 
we can establish with specific technologies as follows: 
 
 
 
In this synthetic diagram of Ihde‘s, the alterity relations between human and technologies 
appear as happening in ways that are, to some extent, separated and independent from the 
actual world. 
 
 
4. BACKGROUND RELATIONS: In Technology and the Lifeworld, Ihde grouped in the 
fourth category technologies that work as the background contexts for human experience 
and action. The buzzing of fridges, the warm air from heating installations, email 
notifications popping up while one is busy writing a philosophical essay, et cetera. In these 
examples, as already mentioned at the end of the third section of this essay, technologies 
typically fade into the background of our conscious experience. When they establish 
background relations with human beings, technologies provide the unassuming setting for 
human existence, rather than emerging in our consciousness as objects of experience. Ihde 
schematized the background relations that we can establish with specific technologies as 
follows: 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the absence of an arrow in this synthetic representation of Ihde‘s 
conception of background relations denotes the absence of a deliberate and conscious 
relationship between the human subject and a technological world.  
 
In the first section of this essay I introduced a basic definition of what ontology is, that is to say a 
specific way to structure knowledge that emerges from our perceptual, cognitive and operational 
relationships with a world. If we accept this fundamental definition, it follows that any relationships 
with technologies that enhance, extend, or dislocate our native perceptual, cognitive and operational 
‗reach‘ must be recognized as also having ontological effects on the human beings that engage with 
them. This point was already briefly introduced in the third and fourth section of this paper. The 
reason why I am bringing it up again in relation to Ihde‘s work is that I believe that his fourfold 
categorization can help us better understand the various effects that our technologies have on the 
human scale and on human kinds of ontologies. In the following paragraphs, and starting from 
Ihde‘s framework, I will try to identify changes in human scale and ontologies as ensuing from the 
four relationships that humans can establish with specific technologies. 
 
1. Technologies establishing EMBODIED RELATIONS with human beings can be 
recognized as leading to the emergence of ontologies that could not be developed in our 
native relationships with the actual world. In this sense, technologies like the microscope, 
the telescope, the microtome, and brain implants effectively change the human being into a 
new, hybrid being. This hybridization typically leads to an extension of the human scale in 
terms of the perceptual, cognitive, and operational capabilities. In line with Donna 
Haraway‘s work, I will call the ontologies that emerge from this form of technological 
supplementation ‗cyborg ontologies‘ (Haraway, 1991). In summary, embodied relations 
with technologies produce new, hybrid beings (cyborgs). As such, they have the effect 
of extending the human scale for perception, cognition, and agency, and give rise to 
cyborg ontologies. 
 
 
2. Differently from the previous case, technologies establishing HERMENEUTIC 
RELATIONS do not effectively produce a new, hybrid being, but rather enrich the native 
possibilities of our sensory tools and natural effectors. As such, they cannot be understood 
as factors of change in the human scale, but rather they broaden the spectrum of our 
possibility to interpret and understand a world that is already disclosed for us. In 
philosophical terms, these technologies allow – with the disclosure of new knowledge, 
rather than new beings or new worlds – for the restructuring and the deepening of prevailing 
ontological frameworks and categories. In this sense, hermeneutic relations do not give 
rise to new beings, but to new knowledge about the world. As such, they cannot extend 
the scale of human perception and human agency, but allow for the structuring of 
revisionary ontologies. 
 
 
3. As briefly outlined before, technologies establishing ALTERITY RELATIONS can 
effectively disclose the experience of new worlds for their users. These new worlds 
temporarily bracket our experience of the world we share as biological creatures and ask us 
to conform to new perceptual, cognitive, and operational canons. The aesthetical qualities, 
the behaviors, and the interactive possibilities of these ‗other‘ worlds bear no necessary 
logical dependence with the actual one, and disclose an artificial (and often unworldly) 
experiential field where human ontologies can be projected, extended, fragmented and 
distorted (Gualeni, 2015, 68). Technologies establishing alterity relations with human 
beings allow for the effective experience and manipulation of new worlds. As such, they 
cannot lead to a change in the temporal or spatial scale that characterizes human 
beings in the actual world, but nevertheless give rise to the emergence of virtual 
ontologies
7
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 With a specific focus on the ontological effects of the experience of virtual worlds, my 2015 book Virtual Worlds as 
Philosophical Tools argues that digital simulations need to be recognized as extending, distorting, and fragmenting the 
perceptual, cognitive, critical, and operational capabilities of human beings. This augmentation allows us to 
  
4. Technologies that establish background relationships with human beings work unobtrusively 
and largely unnoticeably on the background of already established relationships with the 
world. As such, I do not consider technologies that establish BACKGROUND 
RELATIONS to have any explicit effects on the human scale or human kinds of 
ontologies. This is not to say that they do not have a role in the formation of our ontologies: 
as already mentioned in the third section of this essay, they always implicitly contribute to 
our lifeworld and to the shaping of the inevitable process of human thought and reasoning 
called metaphorism. 
 
In summary, through technological mediation we can engage the world in ways that evidently 
transcend the perceptual, cognitive, and operational possibilities of our biological bodies. Moreover, 
technologies can have distinctly identifiable effects on our capability to structure knowledge and 
elaborate thought as human beings. In particular, I categorized these technologically-aided 
ontological possibilities in three groups, based on their specific ways to augment our possibilities to 
understand worlds and operate in them. 
 
 CYBORG ONTOLOGIES ensuing from the embodiment of technologies, 
 
 REVISIONARY ONTOLOGIES stimulated by the development of new knowledge by 
means of technological mediation, and 
 
 VIRTUAL ONTOLOGIES emerging from the disclosure of virtual worlds in our 
projectual and experiential relations with the digital medium. 
 
On this basis, in the upcoming conclusive section, I will propose to reframe the discipline of 
ontology as a branch of philosophy oriented towards projectivity and characterized by historical 
dimension, rather than a purely descriptive, essentialist one. Inevitably, this proposition will also 
entail arguing for a contextual understanding of the concept of mesoscopy.   
 
 
 
6 – Conclusions 
 
Ontology has traditionally been understood as a philosophical discipline characterized by  
 its focusing on structuring fundamental knowledge concerning the mesoscale of human 
beings, and 
 its deliberately excluding contextual or historical factors in the structuring of such 
knowledge.  
 
This understanding was exemplified in this essay by the essentialist perspectives of the early 
Heidegger and early Ferraris. In order to demystify this essentialist and ahistorical understanding of 
ontology, my essay articulated anthropological reflections on the socio-cultural effects of 
technological mediation. Such reflections revealed that the ways in which we structure ontologies as 
human beings cannot avoid being characterized by historical dimensions. In this sense, the study of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
experientially transcend what is ‗actually present‘ and can contribute to projectually shaping our thoughts and behaviors 
in virtual contexts. Those virtual contexts, besides, are themselves artefacts that can be designed and manipulated. This 
cultural shift towards modality and projectuality grants human beings the possibility to structure ‗virtual ontologies‘ that 
are (at least conceptually) independent from the ones that we can structure in relation to the world that we share as 
biological organisms.  
explicit ontological changes (ontological archaeology?) could become a useful sub-discipline that 
could assist us in the task of understanding cultural transformations as well as their connections 
with changes in our relationships with technologies and technological systems. 
 
What follows from the observations offered in this essay is that the discipline of ontology can only 
be expected to be relevant and useful in our progressively more technologically-involved society if 
reframed as a projectual and historical discipline. What I am proposing, allow me to repeat it once 
again, is a repurposing of ontological methods and insights that can accompany socio-cultural 
practices in their historical process of change, and that can assist mankind in its projectual pursuit 
for meaning, balance, and self-discovery. 
 
The need for the outlined reframing of ontology as a projectual discipline appears especially 
evident, in my opinion, when analyzing our relationships with the virtual worlds of videogames and 
computer simulations. Those technological systems vividly materialize mankind‘s tendency and 
aspiration to overcome the physical, perceptual, cognitive, and operational limitations that define 
our existence. Moreover, when taking the role of creators of virtual worlds (and not just of players, 
users, visitors, or spectators), the digital medium grants us a direct involvement in the design, 
construction, and manipulation of artificial worlds as well as in the disclosure of novel possibilities 
to structure ontologies. In this sense, virtual worlds are recognized as onto-logical machines: the 
artificial contexts where human kinds of ontologies can transcend the previously univocal 
relationship with the actual world, and where a new humanism has already begun to arise. 
 
The envisaged reframing of ontology will not only entail its becoming more culturally contextual 
and sensitive to technological changes, but it will also involve re-thinking what we mean when we 
talk about the ‗human scale‘. As mentioned before, the reformulation of the concept of mesoscopy 
will need to cater for a historical and projectual understanding of the human being and, as such, it 
will be challenged to overcome essentialist stances. 
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